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Introduction

Board of Directors' Structure and
Corporate Tax Aggressiveness
of Listed Industrial Goods
Companies in Nigeria

T

axation plays a vital role towards the
development of Nigerian economy. It provides
revenue for government to nance all the
activities, ensures resources redistribution, and
generates employment. Payment of tax is a civic
duty and an imposed contribution by government
on her subjects to enable her nance or run public
utilities and perform other social responsibilities.
Given this, tax system serves as a scal tool used by
governments all around the world to achieve her
primary objectives such as infrastructural
development, enhanced security, ensuring
economic growth and sustainable development
(Bebeji, Mohammed and Tanko, 2015). Although,
there are a lot of anti-avoidance laws in most of the
countries around the world, however, companies do
employ tax experts (tax accountants) to help them in
the preparation of false nancial statement in order
to pay less tax to the authority concern. (Babayo,
2017)
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Desai and Dharmapala (2006) opined that tax
aggressive planning involves some levels of
obfuscation and complexity to prevent its detection.
Thus, if a rm opts for it, it gives room for managers to
divert the rm's resource and low level of tax
enforcements. Therefore, corporate tax
aggressiveness seems to be one of the most
challenging issues of our generation as it exposes a
company to technical tax and reputational risk; and
also represents a serious loss of revenue to the
government. Recently in (2017), there was a lot of
malpractices by corporate bodies were by
companies adopted different aggressive ways to
reduce their tax obligations. This became an
alarming cry as the problem of tax aggressiveness
(avoidance) bedevilled the tax system of both
developed and developing countries. (Mustapha
and Nasir, 2018)

Abstract
Taxation plays a vital role in nancing all government
projects and activities, as such, the studies of tax
aggressiveness can assist policy makers and tax authorities
in addressing companies' illegal tax schemes and taxing
business more equitable in the sense that every entity pays
their fair share of taxes. The study examines the effect of
board structure on tax aggressive of selected industrial
goods companies listed in Nigeria Stock Exchange from
20016-2020. Data were obtained from annual report and
account of the companies under investigation.
Descriptive statistics, ordinary least square regression
technique were used to estimate the model. Hausman's
specication test was also conducted to choose between
xed and random effect, the test favoured random effect
over xed effect. The result reveals that rm size (FSZ) and
leverage (LEV) are negatively related to tax rate while
board size (BSZ), independent directors (IND) and return on
equity (ROE) are positively related to tax rate. It was also
found that an independent director (IND) was statistically
signicant at 1% level, while board size (BSZ) was negatively
insignicant. The study concluded that board size (BSZ) has
signicant role to play in reducing tax aggressiveness of
listed industrial goods in Nigeria and as such the study
recommends that regulatory bodies should enforce strict
compliance to the provisions of the codes of best
practices by Nigerian companies.

The effort made by the government on the
implementation of tax laws in Nigeria proved
abortive as corporate tax departments were tuned
as a prot centre managing a portfolio of tax issues
with signicant emphasis on minimising the amount
of tax to be paid. For instance, in the famous Enron
case the company's tax department had been
turned into a revenue centre, having its annual
target. It was then revealed that when a company is
being taxed aggressive, investors may not be the
benefactors as the complicated transactions and
professional cost used to avoid taxes were so
expensive and cost the company much. As a result,
the investors actually do not benet (Martinez,
Ribeiro, & Funchal, 2015). It was also an issue of
increasing concern to several parties in the UK, due
to the fact that tax planning potentially had a

Key words: Tax aggressiveness, board structure, return on
equity and industrial goods,

25

OCTOBER - DECEMBER, 2021

Volume 45, No. 4

The study evaluates the effect of board of director's
structure on tax aggressiveness of listed industrial
goods in Nigeria for the period of twelve (12) years
between (2007-2018). However the specic
objectives are to:

negative effect on the level of provision of public
goods which then contributed to lots of social issues
(Hanlon & Slemrod, 2006).
Furthermore, the lack of tax governance-related
information made shareholders value tax planning
differently. It is generally expected that shareholders
prefer tax aggressiveness since ordinarily paying less
tax implies that the rm saves money for its
shareholders, This may lead to agency problems as
the (board of directors) may not align with the
shareholders (investors), thereby making the tax
issues complicated (Duke, & Kanlpang, 2011).

LITERATURE REVIEW

Martinez et al., (2015) investigated the effects of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on the tax aggressiveness
of Brazilian rms listed on the BM & FBovespa between
2004 and 2012. The Partial regression analysis model
was used to analyse the data collected. In practical
terms, the result evidenced that the implementation
of more stringent internal control does not inhibit
aggressive tax practices of Brazilian rms. Thus, they
concluded that despite the strong empirical
evidence that better internal controls improve the
quality of accounting results, these rules alone did not
appear to have a signicant effect in reducing the
tax aggressiveness of the rms during the period
studied.

From the above discussion, the following research
questions became pertinent:

How effect does independent directors have on
tax aggressive in listed Industrial Goods?

assess the effect of independent directors on tax
aggressiveness in listed Industrial Goods in Nigeria.

The stakeholders' theory provides that the rm is a
system of stakeholders operating within the larger
system of the host society that provides the necessary
legal and market infrastructure for the rms' activities
(Khurana, & Moser, 2013). The purpose of the rm is to
create wealth or value for its stakeholders by
converting their stakes into goods and services.

Research Questions

ii.

ii.

The study lies on stakeholder's theory as tax
aggressiveness become an act aimed at reducing
tax liabilities in a planned manner. It is thus important
to understand that the interests of stakeholders are
not adequately protected as a rm becomes tax
aggressive. Companies tend to violate the codes of
best practices suggesting that they should be
ethically and morally responsible to their
stakeholders; thus they tend not to be socially
responsible by minimizing their tax liabilities. For
instance, tax aggressiveness affects the stake of the
government directly and the public indirectly; as
reduction in tax liabilities shrinks government revenue
which were to be used in providing infrastructures for
the country, which in turn brings about enhanced
economic growth and development. (Jiraporn, Kim,
& Davidson (2005)

It is against this background that the study undertakes
with a view to evaluate the effect of board of
directors on the corporate tax aggressiveness of listed
cement companies in Nigeria. The study is signicant
in the sense that it would be of immense benet not
only to the companies in the Nigerian industrial
sector, but also to the Nigerian economy in its entirety
in improving tax aggressiveness, enhancing value
driving performance for company's survival and in
evaluating investment. The study would motivate the
regulators in promulgating better corporate
governance regulations that would be more
encompassing and contribute effectively to
enhancing rm values and resolving agency conict.

What is the effect of board size on tax
aggressiveness in listed Industrial Goods?

evaluate the effect of board size on tax
aggressiveness in listed Industrial Goods in Nigeria.

2.

As the proliferation of corporate scandal gain its
stead in business operations across the globe,
investors gradually lost condence in the Capital
Markets. As such, Hanlon, and Slemrod (2006) asserts
that on the average, a company's stock price
declines when there is news about its involvement in
tax aggressiveness. This led to great loss of investment
by investors' as stock prices gradually declined from a
bullish state to a bearish status. Also, Klein and Lefer
(1981) argued that customers and suppliers might
become wary of dealing with such rms associated
with tax aggressiveness, thereby increasing future
transaction costs and perhaps causing customers
and suppliers to deal with other companies. This is
because, engagement in unknown aggressive
activity could head to prosecution and associated
costs ( Khurana, & Moser, 2013). Desai and
Dharmapala (2009) opined that tax aggressiveness
may signal dishonesty been extended to the nancial
accounting statements.

I.

I.

Bujie (2015) evaluated the effect of board
characteristics on tax aggressiveness of listed banks
in Uganda. The data was analysed using the
regression model and the study nds relationships
between corporate governance factors such as

26

OCTOBER - DECEMBER, 2021

Volume 45, No. 4
directors' average number of shares in the company,
board independency, shareholder power, power of
minority shareholders and the effective tax rate, but
the relationship may be greatly affected by
economic environment. The study concluded that
corporate governance factors indeed affects the tax
aggressiveness of the companies in Germany.

that the need for the implementation of international
codes on corporate governance practices is
imperative; as that call for greater independence of
the board.
Zemzem, and Ftouhi (2013) investigated the effects of
board of directors' characteristics on tax
aggressiveness, using a sample of 73 French
companies on the SBF 120 index for the period of 2006
to 2010. A regression analysis was used to estimate the
data collected. The ndings of the study showed that
the board size and the percentage of women in the
board affect the activity of tax aggressiveness; while
Return on assets and size of the rm were signicantly
and positively associated. It was also revealed that
the higher proportion of outside members and duality
don't reduce the likelihood of tax aggressiveness. The
study created a unique insight into board diversity
and its impact on tax aggressiveness.

Khaoula (2013) examined the inuence of corporate
governance on tax planning of selected American
companies from 1996 to 2009. Multiple regression
analysis was used to analyse the data gathered and
the ndings of the study revealed directors constitute
fundamental factors of corporate tax planning.
However, the study found no signicant relationship
between board size and the corporate effective tax
rates. The ndings of the study support the positive
effect of the incentive compensation plans on the
CEO performance; and thus, concludes that the
adopted compensations policy motivates the COEs
to decrease the corporate scal charges.

Based on the reviewed literature the following
hypotheses were developed.

Jalali and Jalali (2013) determined the impact of
board of directors' Structure on Tax Avoidance in
companies Listed in Tehran Stock Exchange for the
period 2010 to 2012. The logistic regression method
was used in order to evaluate the data used. the
study revealed that the independence of the board
had a signicant relation with the aggressive tax
policies. However, the ratio of non-executive
members of the board did not show a positive and
signicant relation with tax avoidance policies.
Moreover, board change cannot formulate the tax
avoidance policies. The study concluded that a
board of increased number of non-executive
members apply less aggressive tax policies and also
that board changes is not-executive directors that
are competent with adequate knowledge on board
matters; this will enhance the integrity and
independence of the board.

HO1: there is no signicant effect between board size
and tax aggressiveness on listed industrial goods
companies in Nigeria.
HO 2 : there is no signicant effect between
independent directors and tax aggressiveness on
listed industrial goods companies in Nigeria.
3.

METHODOLOGY

Since the data is panel in nature the study adopts expost factor research design. Out of twenty two (22)
listed Industrial goods in Nigeria, fteen companies
were selected using simple convenient technique for
the period of ve years from 2016-2020 indicating that
seven (7) industrial goods companies does not have
complete annual report and account for the period
under investigation as a result of poor capital
constraint and insecurity leading to their liquidation
and opt them out as quoted companies in Nigeria.
The data was estimated and analysed by employing
multiple regression using STATA 16 statistical software.

Stavroula (2015) studied the association between
corporate governance practices and the extent of
tax evasion for the Greek listed companies in Athens
from 2000 to 2004; when they operated in an
accounting environment characterized by a high
level of book-tax conformity. A univariate analysis was
used to estimate the data collected. The ndings of
the study observed that tax evasion is lower when the
chairman of the board is also the owner of the
company. A strong negative association was
reported between tax evasion and the percentage
of shares held by the owner and its family members
and also percentage of stock held by board
members. The remuneration of board members
through the distribution of prots was found to
signicantly decrease the evasion of taxes whereas
tax evasion is higher when board members are also
employees of the company. The study concluded

Model Specication
The model connecting Tax aggressiveness with board
structure is given as:
TA= f (Board characteristics) ………….............….....(1)
TA = f (BSZ, IND, ROE, FSZ, and LEV) ………..………. (2)
equation (2) can also be Specied as:
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value (coefcient of variability), gives the extent of
changeability of the variable. In this case, TRT
(dependent variable) has highest coefcient of
variability. This means, TRT varies over the period (2007
to 2018) more than any other variable considered in
this study. Therefore the choice of panel regression
becomes necessary for the estimation of the model.

Where:
TA = Tax aggressiveness is measured by Tax Rate
(TRT)
BSZ = Board size
IND = independent directors
ROE= Return on Equity

Table 2: Correlation Matrix

LEV=Leverage

VARIABLE
BSZ
TRT
SZE
BSZ
1.000
TRT
0.163 1.000
SZE
0.144 -0.0225 1.000
IND
0.583 0.0086 0.312
LEV
0.102 -0.0016 0.0808
ROE
-0.109 0.059
-0.075
Source: Authors Computation, (2020).

FSZ= Size (Natural Log of Total Assets)
α=Constant Term
I =No of Firms
t= Time Period
= Error term

4.

IND

LEV

ROE

1.000
0.0346
-0.155

1.000
-0.0123

1.000

In data analysis, test of Multicollinearity via
correlation is imperative. Multicollinearity implies
interdependence among independent variables in
a regression model. It is an economic problem that
nullies the result of least square regression and leads
to wrong statistical implications as well as misleading
policy decisions in research. To examine the
existence or otherwise of interdependence among
the variables used in this study, a pair-wise correlation
test was conducted. This shows the nature of
relationship between each pair of the variables used.
The result of the correlation as presented in the table
above, shows that SZE and LEV are negatively related
to TRT while all other variables are positively related to
it. Equally, there are mixtures of positive and negative
relationship among the variables. Yet, the coefcient
of correlations is less than 0.5 for all the variables.
Therefore, the correlation among the variables is very
weak which indicate the absence of multicollinearity
among the variables

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

This section present the analysis of result and
discussion of ndings, descriptive analysis of variables
under investigation, correlation, xed and random
effect test as well as Hausman tests were conducted
below.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics

In order to examine the characteristics of the series,
the descriptive statistics of the variables used in this
study for the 15 Industrial Companies over the period
twelve (12) years 2007 to 2018 are presented in Table
1. The mean values of tax rate(TRT), board size (BSZ),
independent directors (IND), leverage (LEV), return
on equity (ROE) and rm size (SZE) 0.75, 5.42, 1.00,
1.54, 0.01, and 6.20,while the median values are 0.22,
4.28, 1.00, 0.18, 0.02,and 4.00 respectively.

Table 3: Fixed and Random Effect Regression Result
VARIABLES

Fixed effect

Board Size (BSZ)

-0.01132
(0.2114)
Independent
directors 1.3212***
(IND)
(1.0549)
Firm size (FSZ)
-0.1224
(0.2631)
Return on Equity (ROE)
0.1316
(1.1235)
Leverage (LEV)
2.117e-06
(0.0131)
Constant
8.909***
(1.9596)
R-squared
0.112

The descriptive statistics also shows that there are
large margins between the minimum and maximum
values of the series. This is an indication of enormous
uctuations of the variables over the period
considered. In other words, there are signicant
changes in all the variables over the period as
indicated by their standard deviation (TRT)12.01,
(BSZ)1.11, (IND)1.00, (LEV)15.43, (ROE)0.11, and
(SZE)1.22, respectively. This shows that the variables
are not constant over time. Hence, the study
examines their relationship and impact on the
dependent variable (TRT). Meanwhile, dividing the
standard deviation of each variable by its mean

Random
effect
0.0149
(0.2170)
1.0289***
(0.1683)
-0.0754
(0.2358)
0.5711
(1.0276)
3.9791e-02
(0.0017)
15.037***
(2.6134)
15

Source: Authors computation (2020).

Standard errors in parentheses ***, ** and * denote
1%, 5% and 10% level of signicance respectively
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The result of the xed effect regressions for the
investigation of the effect of board characteristics on
corporate tax aggressiveness is represented in by TRT
while the independent variables are Board size (BSZ),
Independent directors (IND), Firm size (FSZ), Return on
Asset (ROE) and Leverage (LEV).

Table 4. Hausman Test

The result in table 3 indicates that BSZ and FSZ are
negatively related to tax rate (TRT), -0.01132 and 0.1224, as seen in the coefcient of the variables
0.2114 and 0.2631 respectively. While (IND), (ROE)
and (LEV) are positively related to TRT 1.3212, .1316
and 2.11 respectively as also revealed by the
coefcient of the variables 1.0549, 1.1235, and
0.01331 respectively. However, an independent
director (IND) is the variable that is statistically
signicant. This implies that the variable independent
directors (IND) have signicant impact on corporate
tax aggressiveness measured by TRT of Listed
industrial goods companies in Nigeria.

Authors computation, (2020).

Model Test Summary Chi-Sq. Chi-Sq. d.f
Statistic
One

Cross-section
random

13.21

4

Prob.
0.1535

Hausman test was conducted to make a choice
between Fixed and Random Effects Model estimates
as shown on the table above the calculated p-value
is lower than signicance level of 5%, we are not
inclined to accept the null hypothesis that the
differences between the estimated parameters
yielded by the two estimation techniques are not
systematic. As a result, random effects method
produces better results for the model and is therefore
adopted for this study.

The extent of the impact of the variables is measured
by the values of the coefcients of the variables in
(table 3). By size, the estimates of the coefcients
show that an increase in independent directors (IND)
will respectively lead to 0.2114 and 0.2631 increases
in the (TRT). By implication, listed industrial goods
companies in Nigeria with higher number of
independent directors (IND) would have higher tax
rate (TRT). This indicates that independent directors
(IND) have great impact on tax aggressiveness of
listed industrial goods companies in Nigeria.

RESULT INTERPRETATION
The existence of independent director on the board
was examined and the study revealed a positive
relationship between both variables, as the
existence of independent director has a signicant
impact on tax aggressiveness of quoted nancial
service companies in Nigeria. This implies that the
existence of a higher percentage of independent
directors on the board increases the effective tax
rate (tax aggressive activities are low). In other words,
the presence of independent director impacts
negatively on tax aggressiveness of Nigeria industrial
goods companies; thus the null hypothesis is
rejected. Therefore, nding this study in line with the
work of (Mustapha and Nasir 2018), in Pakistan, but
contradict the works of (Martinez et al, 2015) which
showed that the existence of independent directors
had no signicant effect on the corporate tax
planning of Brazil.

Meanwhile, the random effect result shows that FSZ is
negatively related to (TRT) at -0.0754 with a
coefcient of 0.2358 while Board size (BSZ),
Independent directors (IND), return on equity (ROE)
and leverage (LEV) (0.0149,1.0289,0.5711 and
3.9791) with coefcients of (0.2170, 0.1683, 0.0276
and 0.0017) are positively related to TRT. This is similar
to that of the xed effect regression except for the FSZ
that has negative relationship with TRT in the xed
effect model earlier reported. Meanwhile, the
random effect model shows that Independent
directors are statistically signicant.

5. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Based on the ndings, the study concludes that
signicant relationship exists between board
characteristics and tax aggressiveness of listed
industrial goods companies in Nigeria. Therefore, the
study recommends that the listed industrial goods
companies in Nigeria should give less attention to the
size of their board, and focus on the quality and
integrity of the members of the board; in respect to
her members having broad cognate experience
and expertise on board matters. More so, they should
adhere strictly to the provisions of the SEC and CBN
code of corporate governance which provides that
a company should have one (1) and two (2)
independent directors respectively. This is
necessitated as the presence of independent
directors to ensure independence of the board.

As seen in the table above, the signicance is
indicated by asterisks. The statistical signicance
implies that, IND is important determinants of TRT.
Thus, the coefcient of the variable as stated above
indicates that an increase in independent directors
(IND 1.0289) will lead to increase in TRT of listed
industrial goods companies. Therefore, the random
effect regression shows that IND has signicant
impact on the TRT and subsequently affect the extent
of tax aggressiveness listed industrial goods
companies in the Nigeria.
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